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Reflecting the wider belief that international tourism offers the opportunity to encourage peace and 
understanding amongst peoples and nations, one objective of Japan’s recent tourism development 
policy is the enhancement of mutual understanding and the promotion of international peace. The 
purpose of this paper is to consider the extent to which this objective is achievable, particularly in the 
context of continuing controversy surrounding the country’s confrontation of its twentieth century 
military heritage in general and its role in the Pacific War in particular. Based on research at two 
‘difficult’ heritage sites, Chiran Peace Museum in Kagoshima Prefecture and Yūshūkan War 
Museum in Tokyo, it explores specifically how the kamikaze phenomenon is commemorated and 
interpreted for international visitors, in so doing revealing a significant degree of dissonance at both 
sites. Not only is a selective narrative of heroic sacrifice presented within a wider revisionist history 
of the Pacific War but also no attempt is made to acknowledge the prevailing cultural context that 
might underpin a more nuanced understanding of the kamikaze. Hence, the paper concludes that a 
meaningful opportunity to enhance international understanding has been missed. 
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Over the last two decades, Japan has witnessed remarkable growth in inbound tourism. In 
2000, 4.7 million international arrivals were recorded; by 2010, this figure had almost 
doubled to 8.6 million but, most notably, an average annual growth rate of around 28 percent 
was achieved between 2012 and 2017 (JNTO, 2019a). By 2018, international arrivals totalled 
almost 31.2 million (JNTO, 2019b). This rapid and sustained increase in international tourism 
reflects a deliberate policy on the part of the Japanese government, the principal objective of 
which is economic growth and regional revitalization (MLIT, 2016: 3), not least to address 
the challenge of an ageing and declining rural population (Crowe-Delaney, 2019). At the 
same time, however, it is also evidence of what Funck and Cooper (2015: 46) refer to as 
Japan’s ‘long-cherished role of fostering long-standing friendship and trust among nations’, 
more recently formalized in its 2013 National Security Strategy (Oros, 2015). Indeed, an 
explicit objective of promoting tourism is the ‘Enhancement of mutual understanding… To 
raise the current position of Japan our forerunners achieved in the condition of international 
peace [sic] and to accomplish our responsibilities at present and in the future’ (MLIT, 2012: 
4). A more recent policy accords greater significance to economic priorities yet still views 
tourism as a means to ‘foster dynamic multicultural exchange’ (MLIT, 2016: 3) including, 
more pragmatically, improving visitor access to and the presentation of heritage sites (MLIT, 
2016: 9). 
Yet, the extent to which such ‘mutual understanding’ can be achieved is debatable. 
On the one hand, ‘Japan today projects an external image in which harmonious coherence 
provides a basis for technical efficiency and cultural excellence’ (Pye, 2003: 45) whilst the 
contemporary hosting of major international events, such as the successful Rugby World Cup 
in 2019 and the Summer Olympics in Tokyo (postponed to 2021), points to positive 
symbiotic engagement with the international community. On the other hand, peaceful 
international (and indeed, domestic) relations are considered by some to remain challenged, 
not least by the manner in which Japan confronts its twentieth century military past. This is 
not to say that the country does not seek to promote peace through its wartime heritage. 
Notably, since it was designated by the government as ‘Japan’s International City of Peace’ 
in 1949 (Yoshida, Bui & Lee, 2016), Hiroshima has not only taken on the leadership of a 
global anti-nuclear weapon movement but has also developed a successful ‘peace tourism’ 
industry based upon its tragic past (Schäfer, 2016) and is emblematic of a contemporary 
Japan adopting a proactive role in international peace and prosperity (Oros, 2015). However, 
as some argue, Hiroshima primarily encourages a victim consciousness (for example, 
Siegenthaler, 2002) whilst, as the author of this paper has personally observed, the newly 
refurbished Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum reveals powerfully the destructive effects of 
the A-bomb but little attempt is made to explain why it was dropped on the city. Hence, 
commentators such as Takenaka (2015: 16) argue that despite increasing manifestations of 
official remorse for the country’s war-time activities, Japanese society today feels ‘no 
obligation to engage in the post-war responsibility discourse’, whilst others suggest that, as at 
Hiroshima, a dominant domestic narrative of victimhood shapes contemporary attitudes 
towards the county’s military past and its approach to international relations (Orr, 2001; 
Yasuaki, 2002). Either way, however, it is evident from the literature that the representation 
of Japan’s wartime heritage is both varied and controversial (Allen & Sakamoto, 2013); as 
Nelson (2003: 445) summarizes, ‘since the end of World War II, diverse interpretations over 
how to represent, acknowledge and atone for Japan’s aggressive exploits throughout Asia and 
the Pacific have occasioned as much controversy and conflict as they have closure’. 
Much of this controversy relates to Yasukini Jinja (Shinto shrine) in Tokyo where 
more than 2.5 million Japanese war dead, including a number of A-Class war criminals, are 
not only commemorated but apotheosised  (Breen, 2004). Consequently, the shrine remains a 
source of both national and international political conflict. Yasukuni is referred to again later 
in this paper but a more specific and equally controversial issue is the commemoration of so-
called kamikaze pilots, more formally referred to as tokkō, or Special Attack Force (Sheftall, 
2008: 155), who undertook suicide missions during the last year of the Pacific War. (It should 
be noted that, as discussed later, suicide missions were also undertaken by divers, suicide 
boats and ‘human torpedoes’ or kaiten. However, the focus of this paper is on kamikaze 
aircraft pilots). Between October 1944, when the first officially sanctioned kamikaze 
operation took place against the Anercican fleet approaching the Philippines (Axell & Kase, 
2002: 40), and the formal end of the war on War on 2nd Setember 1945, some 3,000  Japanese 
airmen died in kamikaze attacks (though some put the figure as high as 5,800 – see Sheftall, 
2008). They are now commemorated at a number of museums and shrines around Japan and, 
unsurprisingly, a number of studies explore the kamikaze phenomenon and its contemporary 
representation (Allen & Sakamoto, 2013; Axell & Kase, 2002; Inuzuka, 2016; Nelson, 2003; 
Sakamoto, 2015; Sheftall, 2008; Yoshida, 2004). Typically, however, these focus on the 
kamikaze within competing discourses on war heritage within Japan; in contrast, the potential 
role of kamikaze heritage sites in both enhancing what is arguably limited knowledge of the 
phenomenon and encouraging wider international understanding and reconciliation through 
tourism has not been considered. This is a notable omission, not least given that, in addition 
to the broader objective of promoting mutual understanding, the most recent tourism policy in 
Japan targets Western nations, in particular the United States, as key international tourist 
markets (MLIT, 2016).  
This paper, therefore, seeks to addreess this gap in the literature. Specifically, it 
explores the manner in which two heritage sites in Japan, namely, the Chiran Peace Museum 
in Kagoshima Prefecture (the country’s principal heritage site dedicated to kamikaze pilots) 
and the Yūshūkan War Museum located within the grounds of Yasukuni Jinja in Tokyo, 
commemorate and interpret the exploits of the kamikaze pilots for both domestic and, in 
particular, international tourists. To do so, it is necessary to consider the historical context in 
which the kamikaze attacks were conceived, authorized and undertaken, but the first task is to 
review how tourism may in principal play a role achieving peace, understanding and 
reconciliation, particularly in the context of post-conflict heritage sites, as a framework for 
the subsequent discussion. 
 
Tourism, peace and mutual understanding 
It is observed that, pragmatically, ‘tourism is far more dependent on peace than peace is on 
tourism’ (Hall, Timothy & Duval, 2004: 3); indeed, research has concluded that although 
international tourism may in some circumstances foster cross-cultural understanding, 
typically ‘tourism is the beneficiary of peace rather than grounds for peace’ Pratt & Liu, 
2016: 82). Nevertheless, it has long been suggested that tourism can be a pathway to 
international peace and mutual understanding. Following the First World War, travel was 
promoted to encourage peaceful relations between former adversarial nations whilst in 1967, 
the United Nation’s International Tourism Year was themed ‘Tourism: Passport to Peace’ 
(Wohlmuther & Wintersteiner, 2014: 17). Subsequently, the World Tourism Organization 
(WTO, 1980) identified international tourism as a vital force for peace, an objective carried 
forward by D’Amore (1988) who, in 1986, founded the International Institute for Peace 
through Tourism. Since then, increasing attention has been paid to the relationship between 
tourism and peace (Blanchard & Higgins-Desboilles, 2013; Moufakkir & Kelly, 2010), the 
belief being that social and cultural connections through tourism ‘spur dialogue and 
exchange, break down cultural barriers and promote the values of tolerance, mutual 
understanding and respect’ (Rifai, 2013: 11). 
 Inevitably, such an overarching ambition for a phenomenon as extensive and diverse 
as contemporary tourism may be considered unrealistic (Litvin, 1998). Certain, particularly 
mass, forms of tourism are unlikely to offer opportunities to encourage peace and 
understanding (Harrison & Sharpley, 2017); moreover, the increasing evidence of so-called 
‘overtourism’ (Milano, Cheer & Novelli, 2019; Pechlaner, Innerhofer & Erschbamer, 2020) 
suggests that, increasingly, conflict and resentment between tourists and destination 
communities may actually be the outcome of tourism development. At the same time, as 
Farmaki (2017) observes, research into the tourism and peace nexus tends to be based upon 
the contact hypothesis – that is, it is assumed that contact between tourists and relevant 
members of destination societies provides the basis for developing mutual understanding and 
promoting peaceful relations. This, she argues, is simplistic; in order to assess the potential 
for reconciliation and peace through tourism it is necessary to take into account a variety of 
factors including the initial cause of the conflict and contemporary contextual influences that 
may inhibit its resolution, as well as the nature, role and governance of tourism in the 
destination. In the context of this paper, such contextual influences might include competing 
perspectives on how to commemorate Japan’s war dead (Jeans, 2005; Yoshida, 2004), a 
longstanding sense of victimhood dating back to the politics of the immediate postwar years 
(Tsutsui, 2009) and contemporary shifts in what Oros (205) refers to as the country’s security  
identity. 
Nevertheless, it is acknowledged that in some contexts, particularly at tourist sites 
related to difficult pasts – or sites of difficult heritage (Logan & Reeves, 2008) – the 
opportunity exists, through appropriate commemoration and interpretation, to encourage 
reconciliation and understanding (Batten, 2008). More specifically, heritage sites of or related 
to conflict between peoples and nations, such as battlefield sites, museums dedicated to 
violent pasts, sites of genocide or memorials to those have lost their lives in acts of terror or 
violence, represent a legitimized space where, in principal at least, visitors with direct, 
indirect or even no connection with the event, its victims and indeed its perpetrators may 
congress to both remember those who suffered in a violent past and also to reconcile 
differences in order to establish a more peaceful present and future (Gurler & Ozer, 2013), to 
ensure that ‘never again’ can such events occur (Lollis, 2014; Williams, 2007). In short, post-
conflict heritage sites may foster accountability, justice, debate and reconciliation, or the 
transformation of ‘relations of hostility and resentment to friendly and harmonious ones’ 
(Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 4; Friedrich, Stone & Rukesha, 2018), as a necessary foundation for 
peace-building (Buckley-Zistel & Schaefer, 2014). 
 The extent to which this might occur inevitably depends on a number of factors, 
including those proposed by Farmaki (2017) referred to above. On the one hand, the 
opportunity exists at such sites to inform, educate and to present ‘the truth’, in so doing 
encouraging all stakeholders to reflect, communicate and overcome past differences in a 
spirit of tolerance and forgiveness. However, a number of requirements should necessarily be 
fulfilled, not least that the site be accessible and welcoming to all who wish to visit, and also 
be managed and presented in a manner that fosters reconciliation, including the appropriate or 
accurate representation of all stakeholders’ heritages or stories (Kelly & Nkabahona, 2010; 
Poria, 2007). Moreover, there should ideally exist both acknowledgement of the need for and 
a wider culture of reconciliation; in other words, all stakeholders should from the outset be 
committed to achieving such peace and understanding (Friedrich, Stone & Rukesha, 2018). 
On the other hand, the very nature of difficult heritage challenges its effective or 
appropriate representation and commemoration. First and foremost, it is highly susceptible to 
political influence (Sharpley, 2009). In other words, the development and interpretation of 
difficult heritage may be undertaken to convey particular political messages or an authorized 
heritage discourse (Smith, 2006), reflecting what Light (2007: 747) refers to more generally 
as the ‘cultural politics of tourism development’. It has long been recognized that, owing to 
its significance and visibility as a social and economic phenomenon, tourism generally may 
be exploited for political or ideological purposes (Richter, 1983), most usually to affirm or 
strengthen cultural identity. As Cano and Mysyk, 2004: 880) observe, ‘the state may assume 
the role of marketer of cultural meanings, in which it attempts to make a statement about 
national identity by promoting [through tourism] selected aspects of a country’s cultural 
patrimony’ (see also Wight, 2016). Such a statement may be intended primarily for a 
domestic audience (Palmer, 1999); equally, it may also be intended for international tourist 
consumption, such as at the Kigali Genocide Memorial in Rwanda where the interpretation of 
the 1994 Genocide and its aftermath arguably seeks to legitimize the contemporary 
government of the country to international visitors (Sharpley & Friedrich, 2016). 
The outcome of political intervention in difficult heritage is but one potential source 
of dissonance or dissonant heritage. As Tunbridge and Ashworth (1996: 21) observe, ‘…all 
heritage is someone’s heritage and therefore logically not someone else’s, and the original 
meaning of an inheritance implies the existence of disinheritance’. This disinheritance occurs 
when there exists a ‘lack of congruence at a particular time or place between people and the 
heritage with which they identify’ (Ashworth & Hartmann, 2005: 253) or, alternatively 
stated, dissonant heritage is manifested when the past is represented or interpreted in such a 
way that, for particular people or ‘subaltern’ (Smith, 2006: 35) groups, their past is distorted 
or displaced. All heritage is inevitably susceptible to dissonance, not only because of the 
existence of multiple interest groups but also because, over time, people’s relationship with 
and understanding of past events may change. However, that dissonance may be enhanced 
when the representation of past events ‘(re)interpret[s] past events to meet contemporary 
political agendas, to erase or deny a particular past [or] to celebrate victory’ (Sharpley, 2009, 
150-1). Moreover, Ashworth and Hartmann (2005: 254) argue that not only does ‘human 
tragedy imbue [dissonance] with a capacity to amplify the effects and thus render more 
serious what otherwise would be dismissable as marginal or trivial’, but also that dissonance 
is inevitable in difficult heritage construction and interpretation. 
In the context of this paper, the existence of dissonance at difficult heritage sites in 
general and at post-conflict sites in particular is, by definition, likely to hinder the promotion 
of understanding and reconciliation. Specifically, unless the heritage of all those involved or 
with an interest in a former conflict is recognized and fully addressed at post-conflict sites, 
then the necessary foundations for peace-building referred to by Buckley-Zistel and Schaefer 
(2014) will not be in place. And as argued below, this is indeed the case at the two kamikaze 
heritage sites in Japan. Not only do they present an authorized revisionist narrative of heroic 
sacrifice of the kamikaze pilots’ exploits, but little or no attempt is made to locate that 
narrative within the wider political and cultural context of the time, a context that might 
foster a more nuanced understanding of the kamikaze phenomenon amongst both domestic 
and international visitors. Therefore, before discussing the interpretation and commemoration 
of the kamikaze at Chiran Peace Museum and Yūshūkan War Museum, the following section 
offers an overview of the historical and cultural circumstances surrounding the kamikaze 
phenomenon. 
 
The kamikaze: The historical context 
The word ‘kamikaze’ is arguably imbued with a certain historical romanticism. Translating as 
‘divine wind’, it was the name given to a powerful typhoon that, in 1281, destroyed the 
invading fleet of the Mongolian Emperor Kublai Khan as it approached Japan, leading the 
Japanese to believe that, if once again facing attack, their country would be similarly saved 
by a divine wind (Chiran, 2017: 11). However, contemporary perceptions of the kamikaze 
phenomenon vary both within and beyond Japan. It is suggested, for example, that to younger 
Japanese it ‘is a curiosity from the past; to the older it is a reminder of a cruel epoch’ (Axell 
& Kase, 2002: 3); more specifically, some Japanese consider the kamikaze pilots to have 
been ‘irrational, heroic and stupid’ (BBC, 2017). To non-Japanese, in contrast, it is probable 
that many maintain a perception of kamikaze pilots as ‘men willing, almost gladly, to die in 
the name of their country and for the sake of their emperor… a soldier in a cockpit, ready to 
do his duty, piloting his plane into the deck of an American ship … and in death, becom[ing] 
something noble’ (Konstantopoulos, 2007: 6). Either way, however, the narrative surrounding 
the phenomenon remains highly contested within Japan (Jeans, 2005; Sheftall, 2008) and, in 
all likelihood, misunderstood beyond the country’s borders. Nevertheless, the historical 
events leading up to the official commencement of kamikaze attacks in 1944 are generally 
acknowledged, as are the broader cultural influences on the apparent willingness of the young 
pilots to undertake the missions.  
 
The kamikaze strategy 
The Pacific War commenced on 8 December 1941 when, following the attack on Pearl 
Harbour, Britain and the USA declared war on Japan. The events leading up to the attack are 
complex (Costello, 1982). However, it is generally considered to have been the inevitable 
outcome of Japan’s foreign policy, specifically its 1931 invasion and occupation of 
Manchuria (north-east China), leading some to consider the Pacific War as part of the wider 
Asia Pacific War of 1931-45 (Ienaga, 2008; Takenaka, 2015).  Japan invaded Manchuria 
primarily to exploit the region’s natural resources but also to fulfil the broader intention of 
establishing a ‘New Order in East Asia’ (Axell & Kase, 2002: 21). This resulted in growing 
opposition amongst Western nations to Japan’s international activities, culminating in the 
USA imposing, amongst other things, an embargo on the export of iron and aviation fuel to 
Japan. As a country with few natural resources of its own, this was seen as a threat to not 
only its international ambitions but its very survival, although the commencement of 
hostilities against the USA in 1941 and subsequent occupation of a number of territories in 
the region was also ironically seen by Japan as an opportunity to liberate Asia from the 
control of the world’s then western colonial powers. 
 Initially, the country enjoyed a number of military successes; however, by mid-1942, 
the tide began to turn. In particular, the Battle of Midway in June of that year, in which much 
of Japan’s naval air power was lost, was a turning point in the Pacific War and her armed 
forces began to suffer a number of setbacks. By mid-1944 it had become recognized by 
Japan’s military leaders that the continuing advances of numerically superior American 
forces could no longer be countered by conventional tactics and, hence, with the Japanese-
occupied Philippines facing imminent attack, and in the face of overwhelming odds, the first 
Special Attack (tokkō) missions were launched against American ships in the October of that 
year. Subsequently, the kamikaze campaign reached its peak near Okinawa during the 
following summer, finally ending with the cessation of hostilities in August 1945. 
 It should be noted that the decision to authorize the Special Attack missions, most 
famously the kamikaze airstrikes but also utilizing manned torpedoes, or kaiten, suicide boats 
(shinyo) and suicide divers, was not universally accepted by Japan’s military leaders. 
Particularly, some questioned the rationale of sending men to certain death but with less 
certainty with regards to successful outcomes (Axell & Kase, 2002); for example, only an 
estimated 10 percent of kamikaze pilots actually crashed into their targets (BBC, 2017) whilst 
kaiten missions are believed to have sunk only three American ships at the cost of 106 kaiten 
pilots, many of whom died on training missions or because of equipment failure (NHHC, 
2019). Equally, there is evidence to suggest that, for a variety of reasons, many of those who 
flew on kamikaze missions were not in fact willing volunteers (Sheftall, 2005). Some 
deliberately ditched their aircraft in the ocean rather than crashing into ships whilst many of 
those who survived (the war having ended prior to their missions taking place) subsequently 
revealed their unwillingness to participate (Axell & Kase, 2002; BBC, 2017). However, not 
only did the process of ‘volunteering’ make it difficult to refuse but also the pilots ‘…knew 
there was no alternative. To refuse to fly was to show a lack of duty to their country and their 
parents.’ (Chiran, 2017: 19), not least because of the tradition of honourable death, based 




The concept of bushido, which translates literally as ‘military knight ways’ (Nitobé, 1908), 
can be traced back to the period of the Meiji Restoration from 1868. Its roots, however, lie in 
Tsunetomo Yamamoto’s Hagakure (see Yamamoto, 2002). Written in the seventeenth 
century, this described the morals and ethics of the Samurai in general and, in particular, the 
belief that it was better to achieve ‘one’s aim in death… than a continued failure to do so in 
life’ (Konstantopoulos, 2007: 11). The Hagakure was subsequently adopted by the early 
Meiji government as a means of unifying Japan; that is, as a means of transferring the loyalty 
held by the former Samurai warrior class to their feudal lords to a sense of loyalty to their 
emperor amongst the Japanese people more widely in the newly unified Japan. 
 In essence, then, bushido represents a moral code, a set of principles that the ancient 
Samurai were required to observe in all aspects of their lives, including justice, courage, 
benevolence, politeness, truthfulness, honour and loyalty (Nitobé, 1908). In his widely-cited 
essay, Nitobé (1908) explains that bushido is underpinned by the twin influences of 
Buddhism and Shintoism. On the one hand, Buddhism encourages a sense of trust in fate, 
acceptance of the inevitable and stoic composure in the face of adversity. On the other hand, 
Shintoism promotes loyalty above all to the Emperor, filial piety (respect for parents and 
elders) and, in particular, reverence for ancestral memory inasmuch as it is believed that the 
souls of the dead remain behind to watch over the living. Specifically, in Shintoism, those 
who die tragically or heroically can be worshipped as gods and therein can be found the 
second way in which young Japanese pilots were encouraged to die for their country, namely, 
through the development of the myth surrounding Yasukini. 
 
The myth of Yasukuni: Noble enshrinement 
As noted earlier in this paper, Yasukuni Jinja in Tokyo is the focus of considerable 
controversy that relates broadly to the relationship between ‘the post-war Japanese state and 
the war dead’ (Breen, 2004: 76). On the one hand, there are those who claim that Yasukuni, 
where the nation’s war dead are apotheosized, is a purely religious instution which should not 
be formally visited by the head of state. To do so is in contradiction of the separation of state 
and religon as enshrined in Japan’s post-war constitution. This position is challeged, on the 
other hand, by those who argue that the state should rightfully honour its war dead; to not do 
so, it is argued, is to succumb to external political pressure. More specifically, however, it 
was the enshrinement of 14 Class-A war criminals at Yusukuni in 1978 and subsequent visits 
by a number of Japanese Prime Ministers that has fuelled this controversy (Inuzuka & Fuchs, 
2014). 
 A full consideration of the debate is beyond the scope of this paper (see, for example, 
Okuyama, 2009; Pye, 2003; Ryu, 2007; Shibuichi, 2005). Importantly, however, the 
contemporary controversy surrounding Yasukuni is the outcome of a process, commencing 
with the Shrine’s establishment in 1869, through which not only dying for the Emperor in 
battle came to be seen in Japan as ‘an act worthy of aspiration and a source of pride’ 
(Takenaka, 2015: 2) but also the war dead became the ‘protector god for Japan’ (ibid., 27). 
This process is referred to by Takenaka (2015: 26) as the development of the Myth of the 
War Experience in which death in battle came to be seen as both sacrifice and resurrection; 
moreover, fundamental to this process was the adaptation of traditional death rituals in Japan. 
At risk of simplification (see Takenaka, 2015 for a detailed discussion), in such rituals 
the founding ancestor of a family’s lineage (or ie) was considered the family god who 
protected the living and, thus, was annually commemorated. Other family members who 
subsequently died would be commemorated for a prescribed period until their spirit was 
considered to have merged with that of the family god. Over time, however, this ritual was 
appropriated so that the emperor came to seen as the founding father of the family which, by 
extension, was the nation. As a consequence, the responsibility for commemorating war dead 
transferred from the family to the nation (at Yasukuni) and their spirits collectively became 
the god of Yasukuni, protector of the nation. Significantly, by the time of the Asia Pacific 
War, the spirits of the war dead at Yasukuni were also referred to collectively as eirei which, 
according to Takenaka, 2015, 90-93) is an invented term meaning noble spirits. Through the 
enshrinement process, war dead were cleansed of any wrong-doing during their lifetime, 
hence the justification for the inclusion of Class-A war criminals at Yasukuni and, arguably, 
the continuing limited sense of responsibility in contemporary Japanese society for their 
country’s war time aggression.  
In short, along with following the code of bushido, kamikaze pilots were, in a sense, 
offered the opportunity to not only sacrifice themselves for the nation and bring honour to 
their families, but also to become noble spirits collectively protecting the nation. And it is this 
cultural context of bushido and promised deification that goes some way to explaining the 
dissonant nature of their commemoration (and consequential implications for encouraging 
mutual understanding amongst all visitors) that is now discussed. 
 
Kamikaze heritage interpretation in Japan 
In order to explore the manner in which it is presented and interpreted for touristic 
consumption, visits were undertaken by the author to two of the country’s principal kamikaze 
heritage sites: Chiran Peace Museum and Yūshūkan War Museum. At each site, field notes 
and, where appropriate, photographs were taken. In addition, secondary data sources, such as 
visitor comment books, English language guide books and related extant research were drawn 
upon, whilst relevant online sources were also accessed. Collectively, these facilitated a 
critical interpretative analysis of the messages conveyed by each museum. 
 
Chiran Peace Museum 
Chiran Peace Museum is located near the site of a former air base at the southern end of the 
island of Kyushu from where, in the final months of the Pacific War in 1945, many kamikaze 
missions were launched against the American fleet at Okinawa. In fact, ‘more kamikaze 
pilots took off from Chiran than anywhere else’ (Chiran, 2017: 5). Little evidence of the 
airfield remains; however,  the Chiran Resource Centre was initially constructed by the town 
in 1975 to preserve and display memorablia, such as letters, photographs and others 
materials, from the kamikaze operations. In the mid-1980s, the Centre was redeveloped with 
state funding and re-opened in 1987 as the Chiran Peace Museum. Commemorating 1,036 
kamikaze pilots (their average age was 21.6 years), almost half of whom flew out of Chiran, 
the museum now attacts more than 500,000 domestic vistors annually, as well as around 
10,000 international visitors.  
The dominance of the domestic market is not, perhaps, surprising given the museum’s 
location, it being relatively distant from the typical international tourist itinerary in Japan. 
However, it is clear that from both a practical perspective and from the message it conveys 
the musuem is also designed primarily for the domestic audience. Regarding the former, an 
audio-tour in English is available but, with the exception of a sign in the main entrance hall 
and a small number of (arguably, carefully selected) translated letters from pilots to their 
families, all information and interpretation is in Japanese. Consquently, and as lamented by 
many (see Tripadvisor, 2020), the experience of international visitors is limited to and 
prescribed by the narration on the audio-guide. Notably, this commences by informing 
visitors that the museum refers to the pilots as tokkō rather than kamikaze because they 
attacked only military and not civilian targets. In so doing, an attempt is arguably being made 
to not only to legitimize the kamikaze strategy but also, perhaps, to distinguish it from the 
more recent Islamic suicide bombings with which commentators on the kamikaze 
phenomenon sometimes draw comparisons (Axell, 2002). 
With regards to the latter, on approaching the museum building, visitors first 
encounter a full-sized replica of a kamikaze plane. This was used in the 2007 Japanese war 
movie, For Those We Love, written by Shintaro Ishihara, the then right-wing governor of 
Tokyo (Danielsen, 2007), which celebated the heroism of the kamikaze pilots. As such, it 
reflected the nationalistic and revisionst narrative of other recent Japanese war movies 
although, according to Danielson (2007), unlike the popularity of other movies, it ‘proked 
disquiet’ amongst audiences, not least for parallels drawn with contemporay ideology-driven 
suicide bombers. Nearby are the statues of both a kamikaze pilot and of  Tome Torihama who 
owned a restaurant in the town where pilots would go, sometimes with their families, prior to 
departing on their final mission. She became known as tokko no haha or the ‘mother of 
special attack pilots’ (Inuzaka, 2016: 151) and also featured in For Those We Love. Her 
restaurant is now a small museum. These installations immediately establish the focus of the 
museum on the pilots themeselves and, on entering the main building, this is confirmed when 
visitors are first confronted with a large mural (the ‘Chiran Requiem’) of a pilot being carried 
from his burning plane by angels. This serves to both represent the deification of the 
kamikaze pilots at Yasukuni and their honourable death but also, more significantly, sets the 
overall tone of the museum’s perspective on the kamikaze phenomenon.  
In front of the mural, a sign (referred to above, in English) states that ‘…the Peace 
Hall was built here in commemoration of the pilots who died heroically in the skies and to 
impart the historical realities behind their lives, as well as pray for enduring peace’. Next to 
the mural, a continual video shows original footage of the kamikaze missions, emphasizing 
the challenges the pilots faced in reaching their targets. Many planes are seen crashing into 
the sea, but successful attacks are also shown. Also, in an adjacent room, physical items are 
on display, including the wreckage of a plane recovered from the seabed off the coast of 
Kagoshima. These, along with other artefacts on diplay elsewhere in the museum, such as 
clothing and other equipment used by the pilots, are tangible and uncontroversial exhibits. 
They include a replica of an A-frame barracks hut, located between the museum and a 
modern shrine dedicated to them, in which pilots would have been billetted prior to their 
missions.  
Most of the museum, however, is given over to photographs of each of the 1,036 
pilots commemorated. Accompanying each photograph is a description of the individual’s 
background, age, education, family and military experience. In addition, original copies of 
their final letters to family and loved ones can be seen in display cases beneath the 
photographs although, as noted above, with the exception of a small number of such letters 
displayed together in a separate section of the museum, these are not accompanied by 
translations into English. However, a selection of translated letters is provided in the 
museum’s official booklet on the kamikaze phenomenon, The Mind of the Kamikaze (Chiran, 
2017), available for purchase. Reproduced under themes such as ‘The Mothers’, ‘Love for 
Children’ and ‘Friendships’, these letters collectively convey a message of duty, selfless 
willing sacrifice, of respect and love for parents and family and happiness for dying for 
Emperor and country. For example, one letter says simply: ‘Dear Parents and everyone in my 
family, At last the long awaited chance has come. It will be my honor to descend into the 
ocean with my enemy’ (Chiran, 2017: 26). Another says ‘Dear Mother and Brother, Now I 
will go. I feel truly happy….I am recalling how every morning when I left to go to 
elementary school I would say “See you later”. Well, now I am leaving and I shall not return. 
I am truly satisfied’ (p. 32), whilst a father writes to his daughters: ‘…Your father can’t be 
the horse you ride on through life, so the two of you take care of each other. Please know 
your father is a happy man. He is riding a vehicle that will chase away our enemies. Become 
as great as your father’ (p. 63). As such, these selected translations emphasize the extent of 
the adoption of the Myth of the War Experience discussed above and directly contradict 
accounts of the unhappiness with which many pilots contemplated their fate. 
The theme of willing sacrifice is further exemplified in stories highlighted during the 
audio tour. One, also related elsewhere (Axell & Kase, 2002), tells of how a wife killed 
herself and her children so that her husband would not be held back from fulfilling his duty; 
another, based on a photograph of five young pilots aged between 17 and 19 who are smiling 
and playing with a puppy, suggests that they were happy even though they were allegedly 
departing on their mission the day after the photograph was taken. Nevertheless, it is also 
acknowledged that, in contrast, at night time many young pilots could be heard ‘weeping 
bitterly… because they were afraid of death and felt a deep sorrow for their very short life’ 
(Chiran, 2017: 19). 
 Overall, then, not only does the museum portray the young Japanese pilots as willing 
actors in the kamikaze campaign, but also the narrative surrounding them emphasizes their 
individuality, youth and humanity, their honour and sacrifice. In other words, there is, as 
Allen and Sakamoto (2013: 1050) put it, a ‘quasi hero worship…evident throughout the 
exhibits’. Not only is this focus on willing sacrifice ‘consistent with Japanese revisionist 
approaches to the memories of the Asia-Pacific War’ (Inuzuka, 2016: 157) but it is also a 
clear manifestation of dissonance as considered earlier in this paper. That is, the narrative 
presented at the museum can itself be challenged – and indeed, has been through the stories 
of those pilots and others who survived the war (Sheftall, 2005) and who have, therefore, 
been disinherited by the museum’s interpretation – yet, of equal if not greater significance, 
other stories are also not told. No attempt is made, for example, to locate the kamikaze 
phenomenon within the context of the war or Japan’s role in it; as one review on Tripadvisor 
(2020) notes, ‘the museum merely glorified the sacrifices made by these kamikaze pilots, and 
totally side-stepped the issues of Japanese aggression and war responsibilities. In my opinion, 
this made the pilots' deaths totally worthless’. No reference is made to the dissent of some 
commanders and pilots opposed to the kamikaze strategy or to its quite evident futility. 
Similarly, no reference is made to the prevailing culture of honourable death within the 
Japanese military at that time, nor the lure of promised deification; and nor is it 
acknowledged that, in essence, those pilots were state-trained suicide bombers (Allen & 
Sakamoto, 2013). Moreover, also absent is any reference to their targets or victims, to the 
equally futile deaths of the crews of American ships that suffered direct hits.  
In short, the museum does not offer the knowledge or stories to enable its visitors, 
whether domestic or international, to begin to understand how and why, in the context of the 
last year of the Pacific War, the kamikaze phenomenon occurred and, in so doing, confront a 
difficult past. Rather, they are presented with a very specific, highly politicized and 
emotionally-laden story that, for some visitors, might elicit feelings of respect and sympathy 
for the pilots but for others, bemusement and perhaps even anger. In turn, this raises the 
question of whether the Chiran Peace Museum, as a site of difficult heritage, might promote 
peace and reconciliation amongst its visitors, whether it is in fact ‘peace museum’. On the 
one hand, many comments made by visitors, reproduced in a volume available for visitors to 
read in a seating area in the museum, suggest that it does. Typically, reference is made to the 
futility and waste of war and to the need for peace, although such arguably inevitable generic 
sentiments are largely expressed through the lens of the sacrifice of the young kamikaze 
pilots; that is, it is not the (untold) stories or heritages of the Pacific War that encourage 
visitors to write ‘never again’, but the senseless loss of thousands of young lives. Moreover, 
some visitors are of the opinion that the pilots’ sacrifice laid the foundations of contemporary 
peace, a subliminal message that, perhaps, the museum intends to convey.  
On the other hand, other comments reveal a more critical perspective; one, for 
example, states: ‘I am from Singapore… my country men also suffered…we lived through 3 
half [sic] years of Japanese occupation’ whilst another visitor (from Norway) simply 
observes: ‘What a strange thing to call this place a peace museum!’ (Chiran Visitors Book: 
10-11). The latter comment reflects the conclusions of others who critique Chiran’s 
interpretation of the kamikaze phenomenon, there being broad consensus that a museum that 
not only honours the pilots as heroes but implies that their actions led to peace (whereas in 
fact they prolonged conflict) cannot be thought of as a peace museum. As Inuzuka (2016: 
126) observes, peace ‘is not integrated rationally into the displays’ messages and pacifism is 
promoted in a rather ambiguous way’. Thus, whilst it may feed a contemporary national 
identity amongst some Japanese visitors and, as a public institution, reflects the national 
ambition for promoting peace through its name, the museum’s quite evident dissonance, or its 
disinheritance of many potential tourists from both Japan and overseas, suggests that rather 
than stimulating understanding and reconciliation, it in fact denies (particularly domestic) 
visitors the opportunity to confront collectively and openly a difficult, controversial past.  
 
Yūshūkan War Museum 
Located within the grounds of (and managed by) Yasukuni Jinja, Yūshūkan is a highly 
controversial museum – indeed, to some, it is more problematic than Yasukuni (Fallows, 
2014) yet, to date, it has attracted far more limited academic attention (for example, Lambert, 
2004; Yamane, 2009). It originally opened 1882 to house artefacts from the Meij era Imperial 
Japanese Army, but the collection was expanded following the first Sino-Japanese War 
(1894-5). The building was demolished after an earthquake in 1923; following 
reconstruction, it opened again in 1932 and was subsequently expanded to include an 
interactive area that proved to be popular amongst visitors. According to Yoshida (2007), and 
arguably reflecting public support for the country’s militarism, 1.9 million people visited the 
museum complex in 1940. Following the Pacific War the museum was closed down and only 
opened again to the public in 1986 with a limited display, attracting relatively few visitors. 
However, after renovation and expansion, it reopened again in 2002 and 226,000 people 
visited the museum between July 2002 and May 2003 (Yoshida, 2007).  Current visitor 
numbers and the balance between domestic and international visitors are not known although 
a significant number of international tourists were observed both in Yasukini and Yūshūkan 
during the author’s visit. 
As a war museum, Yūshūkan is not dedicated specifically to the kamikaze although 
not only is there a memorial statue of a kamikaze pilot loctated near its entrance but also, as 
discussed shortly, the kamikaze feature prominently in one section of the museum, referred to 
in the English language leaflet as the ‘Noble Spirits Sentiment Zone’. Rather, the museum 
presents an extensive collection of military artefacts dating back to the Meiji era but with a 
particular emphasis on twentieth centrury conflicts, specifically the Asia Pacific War from 
1937 onwards. Notably, five exhibition rooms and the so-called Great Exhibition Hall focus 
on the Pacific War, the latter including large exhibits such as a dive-bomber plane, a glider-
bomber and a kaiten human torpedo. Interestingly, a model of a suicide diver is also on 
display in one of the smaller exhibition halls. 
These physical exhibits are, as at Chrian, uncontroversial. Since 2002, however, the 
focus of the museum has also been on education; as Takenaka (2015: 173) observes, the 
objective of the musem is ‘educating the public on Japanese military history during the 
modern period and memorializing and honouring the spirits enshined’. Consequently, much 
of the museum is given over to displays, many summarized in English, that provide a 
narrative of Japan’s military activities. And it is this narrative, conveying a highly revisionist 
history that reflects the ownership and management of Yūshūkan by Yasukini Jinja that is so 
controversial. Inuzuka and Fuchs (2014: 31), for example, argue that the museum ‘promotes a 
position of militarism disguised as self-defense’ that is emphasized in a film with English 
sub-titles that is shown continuously. It was, according to the narrative, the US that triggered 
the Pacific War whilst the aggressors were European nations who had colonized those 
countries on whose resources Japan depended. More bluntly, Fallowes (2014) writes: 
 
The museum is shocking in its mendacity…It is entirely different to create a memorial 
to pay somber respect to those who died in a war… than it is to create a memorial that 
recasts an entire war in a glorified light, including over the widely recognized 
atrocities committed in that war. 
 
For example, on entering Yūshūkan, the visitor is immediately confonted with a locomotive 
used on the infamous death railway beween Thailand and Burma yet reference is made 
neither to how and why that railway was built, nor to the significant loss of life involved in its 
contruction. Similarly, the widely acknowledged Nanking Massacre is referred to as an 
‘incident’ with no mention of the atrocities committed by the Japanese. 
It is within this revisionist historical context promoting an imperialist ideology that 
the kamikaze are commemorated at Yūshūkan. Within the ‘Noble Spirits Sentiments Zone’ 
stands a statue of a kamikaze pilot, whilst cabinets display artefacts related the kamikaze 
campaign. The walls of the rooms are covered with photographs of the pilots and other war 
dead, the noble spirits enshrined at Yasukuni. However, as at Chiran Peace Museum, no 
attempt is made to explain how and why the young men were encouraged to volunteer or to 
acknowledge the waste of young lives. Rather, by association with the message conveyed by 
the museum as a whole, the kamikaze are presented and commemorated as heroic participants 
in a conflict in which Japan fought gloriously to defend herself against Western aggression. 
In other words, not only is the kamilkze heritage at Yūshūkan saturated with dissonance; it is 
also located within an inaccurate, militarist narrative that is more likely to elicit anger and 




The kamikaze strategy arguably remains not only one of the most controversial Japanese 
military campaigns of the Pacific war but also one of the more misunderstood; the perception 
of young men seemingly willing to sacrifice their lives on behalf of their family, country and 
Emperor contradicts a more nuanced and complex reality. Moreover, from an international 
visitor perspective, the kamikaze phenomenon perhaps epitomizes the approach of the 
Japanese military to the Pacific War, to fight and die nobly to the end, whatever the cost. 
Thus, it would be logical to suggest that, given Japan’s stated objective of seeking, through 
international tourism, to enhance mutual understanding and to fulfil its responsibility to 
international peace (MLIT, 2012), the country’s kamikaze heritage offers a potentially 
powerful means of contributing to understanding and encouraging more harmonious 
international relations.  
 From the evidence presented in this paper, however, this opportunity has been 
avoided; in other words, the presentation of kamikaze heritage at the two sites considered in 
this paper competes with Japan’s official proactive stance on promoting international peace 
and understanding. This reflects, in part, the fact that the myth of the military experience 
propagated by Yasukuni Jinja (and which enjoys some support in contemporary Japan) 
directly shapes the narrative of Japanese military history presented at Yūshūkan War 
Museum in particular. However, it also should also be noted that the presentation of Pacific 
War heritage more generally cannot be separated from contemporary Japanese politics which, 
on the one hand, have tended to support an apologist approach towards the country’s Asian 
neighbours but, on the other hand, remain imbued with a sense of victimhood (Tsutsui, 2009). 
Moreover, according to Nakano (2016: 165), more recent years have witnessed the 
emergence of a new political elite ‘often opposed to expressions of war guilt and contrition’ 
and driving a new tide of nationalism, illiberalism and historical revisionism. Hence, the 
manner in which the kamikaze are commemorated as revealed in this paper has undoubtedly 
been shaped by a complex amalgam of contextual influences (Farmaki, 2017) and continues 
to be so. This, in turn, supports the more general argument that not only may what Ashworth 
and Hartmann (2005) consider to be inevitable dissonance at difficult heritage sites be 
enhanced by dominant political and cultural factors but also that, consequently, the 
achievement of understanding and reconciliation through tourism to such sites may be both 
complex and challenging. 
 This may not always be case. Nevertheless, to return to the specific purpose of this 
paper, it is evident that the nature of the comemmoration and interpretation of the kamikaze 
pilots at both Chiran and Yūshūkan, as far as it is accessible to international visitors in terms 
of translated information, raises more questions than it answers. Certainly, a visit to Chiran 
Peace Museum in particular will leave international visitors with the sense that the kamikaze 
pilots were brave and honourable young men who died for their country. Yet, they will be left 
with questions about the prevailing political and cultural system that left the pilots with no 
choice, and why contempoary Japan appears uanble to acknowledge and accept resonsibility 
for its wartime aggression. Moreover, given the overtly nationalistic and militarist narrative 
that is consumed by contemporary generations of Japanese domestic visitors at both sites, the 
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